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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by 
federal court of appeals opinions between March 1, 2010 and September 
17, 2010. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then 
by subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. 
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CIVIL MATTERS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) – Notice and Comment: United 
States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2010) 
The 10th Circuit considered whether an agency may alter “its 
original interpretation of [a] regulation without following the [notice and 
comment] procedural requirements of the [APA][.]” Id. at 1136 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The 10th Circuit noted that defendants relied 
on the D.C. Circuit’s holding that “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation 
an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would 
formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and 
comment rulemaking.” Id. at 1138 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The 3rd, 5th, and 6th Circuits have adopted the D.C. Circuit’s view and 
the 1st and 9th Circuits have taken the contrary position. Id. at 1139. The 
3rd Circuit has held that when “an agency’s present interpretation of a 
regulation is a fundamental modification of a previous interpretation, the 
modification can only be made in accordance with the notice and 
comment requirements of the APA.” Id. at 1139 n.9. The 5th and 6th 
Circuits agreed that “once an agency gives a regulation an interpretation, 
[the APA requires] notice and comment . . . before the interpretation of 
that regulation can be changed.” Id. The 1st and 9th Circuits have stated, 
however, that “[n]o notice and comment rulemaking is required to amend 
a previous interpretive rule.” Id. The 10th Circuit found guidance in the 
language of 5 U.S.C. § 553, “which makes perfectly clear that notice and 
comment procedures required for substantive (or legislative) rules . . . 
[do not] apply to ‘interpretive rules[,]’” and further stated that the 
common holding of the 3rd, 5th and 6th Circuits “flouts the APA’s clear 
distinction between interpretive and substantive rules.” Id. at 1139, 1140. 
The 10th Circuit therefore joined the 1st and 9th Circuits, holding that an 
interpretive rule need not “undergo notice and comment before taking 
effect.” Id. at 1140. 
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BANKRUPTCY 
Practice and Proceedings – Conversion and Dismissal: Jacobsen v. 
Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2010) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a debtor’s right to dismiss 
under [11 U.S.C.] § 1307(b) [is] absolute or [is] qualified by an 
exception for bad faith or abuse of process.” Id. at 653. The court noted 
that the 9th Circuit initially determined that “the right to dismiss was 
absolute,” and the 2nd Circuit agreed, “no such exception existed.” Id. at 
653, 655. By contrast, the 8th Circuit found that § 1307(b) is “subject to 
an exception where a Chapter 13 debtor acts in bad faith or abuses the 
bankruptcy process.” Id. at 654. In a later decision, however, the 9th 
Circuit reasoned that a Supreme Court holding on a similar provision 
“supported an exception to § 1307(b) . . . .” Id. at 669. The 5th Circuit 
ultimately agreed with both the 8th and 9th Circuits, rejecting the 
debtor’s absolute right to dismiss under §1307(b) and limiting that right 
to a finding of bad faith. Id. at 660. The court disagreed with the 2nd 
Circuit’s finding that the debtor’s right to dismiss under §1307(b) is 
absolute and unqualified, characterizing this holding as an “escape 
hatch” for abusive debtors. Id. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that a 
debtor’s right to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) is not absolute and is 
limited to a finding of bad faith. Id. 
Purchase Money Security Interest – Negative Equity: AmeriCredit 
Fin. Servs. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit created a circuit split in addressing “whether a 
creditor has a purchase money security interest in the ‘negative equity’ of 
a vehicle traded in at the time of a new vehicle purchase.” Id. at 1159. 
The court declined to adopt the reasoning of the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 
8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits, all holding that “a creditor has a purchase 
money security interest in the negative equity of a debtor’s trade-in 
vehicle.” Id. at 1160. Considering whether the negative equity in a trade-
in vehicle constituted a “price,” the 9th Circuit first explained that the 
payment of remaining debt on a prior vehicle cannot qualify as an 
“expense” because “[i]t is the payment of an antecedent debt, not an 
expense incurred in buying the new vehicle.” Id. at 1162. The court 
further reasoned that the negative equity of the trade-in vehicle is not 
“closely connected” enough to the purchase of the new vehicle to meet 
the requirements of U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3, even though the transactions 
often occur simultaneously. Id. Finally, the court found that “negative 
equity cannot fall under the ‘other similar obligations’ category because 
negative equity is unlike the examples listed in Comment 3.” Id. The 9th 
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Circuit held “a creditor does not have a purchase money security interest 
in the ‘negative equity’ of a vehicle traded in during a new vehicle 
purchase.” Id. at 1164. 
Selling Causes of Action – Judicial Approval of Settlement in a 
Bankruptcy Proceeding: Cadle Co. v. Mims (In re Moore), 608 F.3d 
253 (5th Cir. 2010) 
The 5th Circuit ruled on two issues that currently split the courts of 
appeals. First, the 5th Circuit addressed “[w]hether [a creditor’s] overbid 
require[s] the bankruptcy court to scrutinize the proposed compromise 
under § 363 and rule 6004, in addition to rule 9019(a) [of the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure],” in other words, “whether the 
settlement of a claim that the estate owns is a sale (that is, disposition) of 
property of the estate.” Id. 263–64. On this issue, the court noted that the 
1st Circuit has held that the settlement of a claim is not a sale, while the 
3rd, 6th, 7th Circuits and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 9th 
Circuit have held that “settlement of a cause of action held by the estate 
is plainly the equivalent of a sale of that claim.” Id. at 264 (citations 
omitted). The 5th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit’s holding that “[t]he 
proposed settlement was a disposition of estate assets.” Id. at 266. Next, 
the 5th Circuit addressed “whether the trustee may sell causes of action 
that arise from his avoidance powers.” Id. at 261. The court noted that 
the 9th Circuit “permits such actions to be sold or transferred” while the 
3rd Circuit does not. Id. at 261 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The 5th Circuit reasoned “[t]he right to re coup a fraudulent conveyance, 
which outside of bankruptcy may be invoked by a creditor, is property of 
the estate that only a trustee or debtor in possession may pursue once a 
bankruptcy is under way” and such claims become part of the estate once 
bankruptcy is underway by virtue of trustee successor rights. Id. at 261 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the 5th Circuit agreed with 
the 7th and 9th Circuits, holding that a “trustee may . . . sell . . . state law 
fraudulent conveyance actions back to [the appellant].” Id.  
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Class Action – Opting In, Post Class Certification: Bright v. United 
States, 603 F.3d 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
The Federal Circuit addressed whether putative class members may 
opt into litigation under U.S. Court of Federal Claims Rule 23 after the 
expiration of the limitations period when a class action complaint was 
within the six-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and “class 
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certification was sought prior to expiration of the limitations period, but 
the complaint was not amended to add other named plaintiffs as putative 
class members until after expiration of the limitations period.” Id. at 
1281. The court noted that the “[3rd] Circuit applied tolling to opt-in 
class actions” while the 11th Circuit “reasoned that tolling should not 
apply to plaintiffs in civil class actions.” Id. at 1285. The Federal Circuit 
agreed with the 3rd Circuit, finding that maintaining the availability of 
the opt-in scheme for class action “is most consistent with the objectives 
which class action procedures are meant to achieve.” Id. The court 
disagreed with the 11th Circuit’s reasoning that a plaintiff does not 
commence a class action when the complaint is filed, but rather when the 
“putative plaintiff files a written consent to opt into the class action.” Id. 
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
Rule 23 permits putative class members to opt into litigation “when class 
certification is sought prior to expiration of the period, but the complaint 
is not amended to add other named plaintiffs as putative class members 
until after the expiration period.” Id. at 1290. 
Court Fees – Sequential or Cumulative Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915: 
Christensen v. Big Horn County Bd. Of County Comm’rs, 374 Fed. 
App’x 821 (10th Cir. 2010) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether 28 U.S.C. § 1915 allows filing 
fees for multiple appeals to be deducted from a prisoner’s account 
sequentially rather than cumulatively. Id. at 829. The court noted that the 
5th, 7th and 8th Circuits determined that the fees for multiple cases 
should be deducted in total, while the 2nd Circuit found that they should 
be sequential. Id. at 830. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 5th, 7th and 
8th Circuits in finding that “the overarching purpose of the statute, to 
restrain runaway prison litigation with some pay-as-you-go constraint, 
would be diluted if not defeated by permitting prisoners with one 
ongoing case to postpone all successive filing fee obligations.” Id. The 
court disagreed with the 2nd Circuit’s position on sequential or per 
prisoner payment, which the 2nd Circuit espoused “to avoid potential 
constitutional concerns over the burden simultaneous collection of 
multiple fee obligations could place on a prisoner’s right of access to the 
courts.” Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded, “§ 1952(b)(2) authorizes 
cumulative deductions of twenty percent for each civil action or appellate 
filing fee incurred by a prisoner.” Id. at 833. 
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District Court Discretion – Federal Magistrate Act: Glidden Co. v. 
Kinsella, 386 Fed. App’x 535 (6th Cir. 2010) 
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether a party may raise new 
arguments before a district judge that were not presented to the 
magistrate judge.” Id. at 544 n.2. The court noted that the 1st, 5th, 8th, 
and 10th Circuits determined that a party waives arguments if it does not 
raise them before a magistrate judge, while the 4th Circuit found that 
district courts must address all arguments regardless of whether parties 
raised them before the magistrate judge. Id. The 6th Circuit also noted 
that the 9th and 11th Circuits held that district courts have discretion not 
to consider an argument if a party did not present it to the magistrate 
judge. Id. The 6th Circuit joined the 1st, 5th, 8th, and 10th Circuits in 
holding that a party waives an argument if it does not raise it before a 
magistrate judge. Id. 
Fraud Class Action – Presumption of Reliance: Malack v. BDO 
Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010) 
The 3rd Circuit considered whether a “fraud-created-the-market” 
theory may establish a presumption of reliance as required by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b), which will satisfy the predominance 
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Id. at 744–45. 
The 3rd Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has “held that a 
presumption of reliance exists in two circumstances”: failure to disclose 
material facts, and fraud-on-the-market. Id. at 747. The 5th and 7th 
Circuits have also included a third theory, fraud-created-the-market, 
which establishes a presumption of reliance when a plaintiff “prove[s] 
that the defendants conspired to bring to market securities that were not 
entitled to be marketed.” Id. at 747–48 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The 3rd Circuit noted that “considerations of fairness, public 
policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy, often underlie the 
creation of presumptions[.]”  Id. at 749 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  It also observed that courts use presumptions to manage 
circumstances in which direct proof is difficult to acquire. Id. The 3rd 
Circuit further commented that the notion of probability is “the most 
important consideration in the creation of presumptions” because “[m]ost 
presumptions have come into existence primarily because judges have 
believed that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact 
A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of 
fact A until the adversary disproves it.” Id. The 3rd Circuit found that 
these considerations “counsel for rejection of the fraud-created-the-
market theory[,]” reasoning that the new theory would encourage 
frivolous litigation that would ultimately cause harm. Id. at 749, 755. The 
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3rd Circuit therefore joined the 7th Circuit in rejecting “fraud-created-
the-market” as a plausible theory for establishing a presumption of 
reliance to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Id. at 745. 
Preliminary Injunctions – Judicial Test: Alliance for the Wild Rockies 
v. Cottrell, 613 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether it was valid to continue using the 
“sliding scale” approach to preliminary injunctions. Id. at 965. The court 
noted that the 4th Circuit determined that the “sliding scale approach is 
now invalid,” while the 2nd and 7th Circuits found the approach valid. 
Id. at 966. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 2nd and 7th Circuits, finding 
the sliding scale approach allows courts to apply a flexible, case-by-case 
analysis of whether to grant a preliminary injunction. Id. at 966–68. 
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that the sliding scale approach continues 
to be a valid approach to the issue of preliminary injunctions. Id. at 968. 
 
ESTATE LAW 
Restitution Order – Abatement ab initio Doctrine: United States v. 
Rich, 603 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “[w]hether a restitution order abates.” Id. 
at 728. The court noted that the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Circuits held that 
restitution orders are not abated, while the 5th and 11th Circuits hold that 
restitution orders are abated. Id. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 5th and 
11th Circuits, finding that the statute imposing restitution “require[d] that 
the defendant first must be ‘convicted of an offense’ . . . to support an 
order of restitution[,]” and “[a]batement of the convictions for those 
offenses . . . nullifies the accompanying restitution order.” Id. 
Furthermore, the court noted that “[t]he common law doctrine of 
abatement ab initio confirms our interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 729. 
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that “[t]he Restitution Order must be 
abated.” Id. 
 
IMMIGRATION 
Jurisdiction – Review of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
Decision: Lopez-Dubon v. Holder, 609 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2010) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the question of whether an issue not 
properly raised by a petitioner in immigration proceedings, but 
nevertheless addressed on the merits by the BIA, may be considered by a 
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federal court of appeals. Id. at 644. The court noted that almost every 
court of appeals will address an issue on the merits when the BIA has 
done so, even if the petitioner did not properly present the issue to the 
BIA. Id. The court observed that only the 11th Circuit bars review when 
a petitioner has not properly raised the issue in immigration proceedings. 
Id. at 645 n.1. The 5th Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits, 
finding “the purpose of the statutory exhaustion requirement is to allow 
the Board of Immigration Appeals the opportunity to apply its 
specialized knowledge and experience to the matter and to resolve a 
controversy or correct its own errors before judicial intervention.” Id. at 
644. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that “[i]f the BIA deems an issue 
sufficiently presented to consider it on the merits, such action by the BIA 
exhausts the issue as far as the agency is concerned and that is all that [is 
statutorily] require[ed] to confer [court of appeals] jurisdiction.” Id. 
Removability – Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA): Claudio v. 
Holder, 601 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2010) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a petitioner exhausts his claims 
by raising all of them in a notice of appeal to the [BIA], but addressing 
only some in a supporting brief.” Id. at 318. The court noted that the 3rd 
Circuit has held “that exhaustion of an issue does not require an appellant 
before the BIA, who has clearly identified an issue in his notice of 
appeal, to reiterate and to address that same issue in an optional brief.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, the 9th Circuit stated 
that “when a petitioner files a brief, he will be deemed to have exhausted 
only those issues he raised and argued in his brief before the BIA.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the 6th Circuit noted that 
“all issues not raised in an appellant’s brief[] [are waived], even if the 
issue has been raised in the notice of appeal.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The 5th Circuit agreed with the 6th and 9th Circuits’ 
reasoning, finding that “once a petitioner elects in his notice of appeal to 
file a brief, that brief becomes the operative document through which any 
issues that a petitioner wishes to have considered must be raised.” Id. at 
319. Thus, the 5th Circuit held that a petitioner does not exhaust his 
claims “when [he] indicates on his notice of appeal that he will file a 
brief and then fails to do so . . . .” Id. at 318. 
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Infringement – Copyright Act: Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit addressed the issue of whether “a copyright [is] 
registered at the time the copyright holder’s application is received by 
the Copyright Office (the ‘application approach’), or at the time that the 
Office acts on the application and issues a certificate of registration (the 
‘registration approach’)[.]” Id. at 615. The court noted that the 5th and 
7th Circuits have adopted the application approach while the 10th and 
11th Circuits have adopted the registration approach. Id. at 616. The 9th 
Circuit agreed with the 5th and 7th Circuits and adopted the application 
approach. Id. at 619. First, the court noted that the ambiguity of the 
Copyright Act made it “necessary to go beyond the Act’s plain language 
to determine which approach better carries out the purpose of the 
statute.” Id. at 618. The court then found that “the application approach 
better fulfills Congress’s purpose of providing broad copyright protection 
while maintaining a robust federal register.” Id. at 619. Therefore, the 9th 
Circuit concluded “that receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete 
application satisfies the registration requirement of § 411(a).” Id. at 621. 
 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – 
Retaliation: Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, 610 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir. 
2010) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether the anti-retaliation provision of 
[§] 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, protects an employee’s unsolicited 
internal complaints to management.” Id. at 218. The court noted that the 
5th and 9th Circuits have determined that the statute’s anti-retaliation 
provision protects an employee’s unsolicited internal complaints to 
management, while the 2nd and 4th Circuits have held that it does not. 
Id. The 3rd Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the 5th and 9th 
Circuits that excluding internal complaints from § 510’s protection 
would “inhibit the effectiveness of the anti-retaliation provision[,]” 
noting that neither circuit closely examined the statutory language in 
arriving at either decision. Id. at 221, 223. Instead, the 3rd Circuit agreed 
with the 2nd and 4th Circuits and concluded that a narrow reading of the 
plain language of § 510’s anti-retaliation provision was appropriate. Id. 
at 221–22. Thus, the 3rd Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision of 
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§ 510 of ERISA does not protect an employee’s unsolicited internal 
complaints to management. Id. at 218. 
Workers Compensation – Injury on Job: Valladolid v. Pac. 
Operations Offshore, LLP, 604 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether “an employee must be injured on 
the outer continental shelf to be eligible for workers’ compensation 
benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)[.]” Id. at 
1129. The court noted that the 3rd Circuit has “rejected the situs-of-
injury test and held that a claimant need only satisfy a ‘but for’ test in 
establishing that the injury occurred as the result of operations on the 
outer continental shelf.” Id. at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Conversely, the 5th Circuit has adopted the situs-of-injury test and has 
required a claimant to “show that the injury occurred on an outer 
continental shelf platform or on the waters above the outer continental 
shelf, in addition to satisfying the ‘but for’ test.” Id. at 1130–31. The 
court disagreed with the 5th Circuit because the “results of an operation 
may regularly extend beyond its immediate physical location.” Id. at 
1134. Further, the court disagreed with the 3rd Circuit, and noted that 
Congress could not have intended to promulgate the simple “but for” 
test. Id. at 1139. Thus, the 9th Circuit adopted a new test and concluded 
that “the claimant must establish a substantial nexus between the injury 
and extractive operations on the shelf[,]” and “[t]o meet the standard, the 
claimant must show that the work performed directly furthers outer 
continental shelf operations and is in the regular course of such 
operations.” Id. 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) – Services, Programs, or 
Activities: Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether sidewalks, curbs and parking 
lots are deemed “services, programs, or activities” under Title II of the 
ADA. Id. at 484–85. The 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 9th Circuits each interpreted 
the phrase “services, programs, or activities broadly . . . allow[ing] 
private claims to force cities to update their systems of pedestrian 
walkways in compliance with Department of Justice regulations.” Id. at 
485 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 9th Circuit concluded 
that Title II includes sidewalks because they are “normal function[s] of a 
government entity.” Id. Similarly, the 3rd and 6th Circuits have held that 
“the phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ encompasses virtually 
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everything that a public entity does.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The 2nd Circuit “called the language a catch-all phrase that 
prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of context,” 
counseling against “hair-splitting arguments over what falls within its 
reach.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Disagreeing with these 
circuits, the 5th Circuit first noted that “the statute’s ‘qualified individual 
with a disability’ definition suggests a distinction between certain 
physical infrastructure on the one hand and services, programs, and 
activities on the other.” Id. at 486. The 5th Circuit acknowledged that 
“services” could nevertheless be broadly construed to include at least 
some infrastructure, thereby finding that the statutory language is 
ambiguous. Id. An examination of the regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Justice revealed that sidewalks, curbs and parking lots are 
facilities that must necessarily be distinct from services, programs, or 
activities, in order to avoid superfluous statutory language and meaning. 
Id. at 487–88. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that “sidewalks, curbs, and 
parking lots” are not “services, programs, or activities” under Title II. Id. 
Declaratory Relief – Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): City of Colton v. Am. 
Promotional Events, Inc. - West, 614 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “[w]hether a CERCLA plaintiff’s failure 
to establish liability for its past costs necessarily dooms its bid to obtain a 
declaratory judgment as to liability for its future costs.” Id. at 1006. The 
court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, and 8th Circuits determined that 
“recoverable past costs are a sine qua non for declaratory relief under 
CERCLA[,]” while the 1st and 10th Circuits “suggested that declaratory 
relief may be available even in the absence of recoverable past costs.” Id. 
at 1006–07. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 3rd, and 8th Circuits, 
viewing the plain language of the statute as indicating that Congress did 
not intend “for a declaration of future liability to be available . . . .” Id. at 
1007–08. The court also found persuasive the argument that “[p]roviding 
declaratory relief based on mere assurances of future compliance with 
the [national contingency plan] would create little incentive for parties to 
ensure that their initial cleanup efforts are on the right track.” Id. at 1008. 
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded, when “the plaintiff fails to establish . . . 
liability in its initial cost-recovery action, no declaratory relief is 
available as a matter of law.” Id. 
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Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) – Compensatory Damages: 
Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010) 
The 3rd Circuit considered whether “a degree of specificity which 
may include corroborating testimony or medical or psychological 
evidence . . .” is necessary to support a compensatory damage award. Id. 
at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 3rd Circuit acknowledged 
that the 2nd and 5th Circuits had rejected evidence similar to that offered 
in this case as “insufficient to support compensatory damage awards[]” 
to support claims that negligent violations of the FCRA caused 
humiliation, embarrassment or mental distress, effectively creating a 
higher standard of proof. Id. at 719–20. The court stated that 
“corroboration goes only to the weight of evidence of injury, not the 
existence of it.” Id. at 720. The court noted that humiliation, 
embarrassment and mental distress are “precisely the kind[s] of injur[ies] 
that Congress must have known would result from violations of the 
FCRA.” Id. The court reasoned that “[i]f a jury accepts testimony of a 
plaintiff that establishes an injury . . . the plaintiff should be allowed to 
recover . . . . The fact that the plaintiff’s injuries relate to stress and 
anxiety caused by the defendant’s conduct does not change that.” Id. The 
3rd Circuit therefore refused to adopt the 5th Circuit’s view, which 
required “a degree of specificity which may include corroborating 
testimony or medical or psychological evidence in support of [a 
compensatory] damage award.” Id. 
State and Territorial Governments – Sovereign Immunity: Iowa 
Tribe v. Salazar, 607 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2010) 
The 10th Circuit addressed the proper construction of a federal 
waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1236–37. The court noted that the 
2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits “applied a time of filing rule to assess the 
United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 2410,” 
while the 1st Circuit took the view that it should construe waivers of 
sovereign immunity narrowly based on congressional intent. Id. The 10th 
Circuit agreed with the 1st Circuit in finding that federal waivers of 
sovereign immunity should be construed narrowly in order to provide 
proper deference to congressional intent. Id. at 1237. The court disagreed 
with the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits’ determination that sovereign 
immunity should be “based on the existence of a waiver at the time of 
filing.” Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that “sovereign immunity is 
an ongoing inquiry rather than a determination to be made based on the 
existence of a waiver at the time of filing.” Id. 
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CRIMINAL MATTERS 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Child Pornography – 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a): United States v. Humphrey, 
608 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2010) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of whether “scienter with 
respect to the victim’s age is an element of the offense under [18 U.S.C.] 
§ 2251(a), and whether a mistake of age defense is available under the 
statute . . . .” Id. at 958. The court noted that the 9th Circuit stands alone 
in finding that “§ 2251(a) does not contain a scienter requirement” but 
that “the First Amendment requires a reasonable mistake-of-age defense” 
under the same statute. Id. at 958–59. Conversely, the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 
and 8th Circuits have rejected the view of the 9th Circuit, holding that “a 
defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s age is not an element of the 
offense[]” and rejecting “the notion espoused [by the 9th Circuit] of a 
constitutionally mandated mistake-of-age defense.” Id. at 960. The 6th 
Circuit also rejected the 9th Circuit and instead followed the majority 
approach. Id. at 962. Therefore, the 6th Circuit concluded that “the 
statutory text, legislative history, and judicial interpretation compel the 
conclusion that knowledge of the victim’s age is neither an element of 
the offense nor textually available as an affirmative defense[]” and that 
“First Amendment concerns, when balanced against the ‘surpassing 
importance of the government’s interest in safeguarding the physical and 
psychological wellbeing of children’ do not oblige us to engraft a 
reasonable mistake-of-age defense onto § 2251(a).” Id. 
Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses – Application in the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA): United States 
v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2010) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “SORNA by its own terms 
applies to sex offenders who were convicted prior to SORNA’s 
enactment.” Id. at 307. The 6th Circuit noted that the 8th and 10th 
Circuits have determined that SORNA applies retroactively, and § 
16913(d) of SORNA only gives the Attorney General limited power to 
prescribe the procedure for convicted offenders to follow. Id. In contrast, 
the 6th Circuit observed that the 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuits 
found that “[SORNA] itself only applies going forward until the 
Attorney General prescribes otherwise.” Id. The 6th Circuit 
acknowledged that it had previously issued a panel decision holding “that 
SORNA was not retroactive as of the date of its enactment and that § 
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16913(d) vested the retroactivity decision with the Attorney General.” Id. 
at 308. The panel decision considered the applicability of an interim rule 
promulgated by the Attorney General, and it held that the “rule did not 
apply SORNA to the defendant . . . where the defendant was indicted . . . 
prior to the comments deadline . . . and less than thirty days after 
publication.” Id. at 310. In the instant case, the 6th Circuit extended the 
panel decision and held that the interim rule could not apply SORNA 
retroactively to “an indictment charging a defendant after the close of the 
comment period and more than thirty days after publication of the rule.” 
Id. The 6th Circuit reasoned that the Attorney General “solicited 
comments, but the interim rule became effective immediately, before 
receipt and review of any public feedback”; therefore, “the interim rule 
did not make SORNA effective against [defendant] or any other 
defendants convicted before SORNA’s enactment.” Id. 
Filing Fee Collection – Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Torres 
v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010) 
The 4th Circuit addressed “whether [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(b)(2) allows 
only a maximum of twenty percent to be taken from a prisoner’s monthly 
income regardless of the number of cases or appeals filed, or [whether] 
the statute require[s] (or permit[s]) twenty percent be taken each month 
for each case or appeal that the prisoner files . . . .” Id. at 241–42. The 
court noted that the 5th, 7th, and 8th Circuits determined that § 
1915(b)(2) requires prisoners to pay “twenty percent of their funds 
towards filing fees per case and per appeal[,]” while the 2nd Circuit 
found that § 1915(b)(2) “cap[s] the payment of fees at twenty percent of 
the prisoner’s income, regardless of the number of cases or appeals for 
which the prisoner is indebted.” Id. at 242. The 4th Circuit agreed with 
the 2nd Circuit, finding that Congress’s intent, according to the 
legislative history and structure of the statute, was to limit the collection 
of all court fees to twenty percent of an inmate’s income. Id. at 245–46. 
The 4th Circuit also agreed with the 2nd Circuit that the alternative “per 
case” interpretation would raise a constitutional question of equal access 
in cases where an inmate’s entire income was subject to garnishment for 
filing fees. Id. at 245. The court disagreed with the 5th, 7th, and 8th 
Circuits in their holding that “per inmate” interpretation would open a 
“floodgate” of prison litigation. Id. at 246. Thus, the 4th Circuit 
concluded that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), the court may garnish an 
inmate’s income up to twenty percent for the payment of court filing fees 
regardless of how many cases or appeals an inmate has filed. Id. at 252. 
2010] Current Circuit Splits 119 
Retroactive Application – Good Cause Promulgation and the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA): United States 
v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the Attorney General’s public 
safety justification qualified as good cause to “promulgate a rule making 
[SORNA] retroactive without notice and comment as required by the 
Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at 1276. The court noted that two 
other circuits had previously addressed this issue. Id. at 1279. The 4th 
Circuit held that “[t]here was a need for legal certainty about SORNA’s 
‘retroactive’ application to sex offenders convicted before SORNA and a 
concern for public safety that these offenders be registered in accordance 
with SORNA as quickly as possible.” Id. Further, the 4th Circuit 
maintained that “[d]elaying implementation of the regulation to 
accommodate notice and comment could reasonably be found to put the 
public safety at greater risk.” Id. In contrast, the 6th Circuit found that 
the Attorney General did not have cause to bypass those requirements in 
a case with similar facts. Id. at 1280. The 11th Circuit agreed with the 
4th Circuit, finding that concerns over public safety justified the 
Attorney General’s actions. Id. at 1281. The 11th Circuit concluded that 
“[r]etroactive application of the rule allowed the federal government to 
immediately start prosecuting sex offenders who failed to register in state 
registries . . . [and] reduced the risk of additional sexual assaults and 
sexual abuse by sex offenders . . . .” Id. 
Underlying Assault – 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1): United States v. Williams, 
602 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2010) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether a defendant can “be convicted of 
forcible resistance under [§ 111(a)(1)] without having committed an 
underlying assault[.]” Id. at 316. The court noted that the 9th Circuit 
found that convictions under the statute “require at least some form of 
assault,” and that “without requiring some sort of underlying assault, it 
would be impossible to distinguish non-assaultive misdemeanor 
resistance cases from felonious resistance cases . . . .” Id. at 316–17. 
Conversely, the 6th Circuit determined that interpreting the statute as 
“requiring an underlying assault for a defendant to be convicted would 
render meaningless the five forms of non-assaultive conduct that are 
plainly proscribed by the statute.” Id. at 317. The 5th Circuit agreed with 
the 6th Circuit that this interpretation promoted the dual purposes of the 
statute, namely: “protect[ing] federal officers by punishing assault . . .” 
and “deter[ring] interference with federal law enforcement activities . . . 
by punishing obstruction and other forms of resistance.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded, “a 
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misdemeanor conviction under § 111(a)(1) does not require underlying 
assaultive conduct.” Id. at 318. 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Fourth Amendment Protection – Probable Cause: Aldini v. Johnson, 
609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of “whether the Fourth 
Amendment continues to provide protection against deliberate use of 
excessive force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial 
detention begins[,]” and specifically whether it is the Fourth Amendment 
or the Fourteenth Amendment that “protect[s] those arrested without a 
warrant between the time of arrest and arraignment.” Id. at 864. The 6th 
Circuit noted that the 2nd, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have found 
“that the Fourth Amendment applies until an individual arrested without 
a warrant appears before a neutral magistrate for arraignment or for a 
probable cause hearing, or until the arrestee leaves the joint or sole 
custody of the arresting officer or officers.” Id. at 865 n.6. The court also 
noted the 5th Circuit’s conclusion “that the relevant constitutional 
provisions overlap and blur in certain factual contexts.” Id. In contrast, 
the court noted that the 4th, 7th, and 11th Circuits have held that “after 
the act of arrest, substantive due process is the proper constitutional 
provision because the Fourth Amendment is no longer relevant.” Id. The 
6th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in finding 
that the “reasonableness standard governs throughout the seizure of a 
person . . . .” Id. at 865. The 6th Circuit disagreed with the 4th, 7th, and 
11th Circuits’ findings that the plaintiff was not in a situation where his 
rights were governed by either the Fourth or the Eighth Amendments. Id. 
Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that where “the plaintiff was a free 
person at the time of the incident, and the use of force occurred in the 
course of an arrest or other seizure of the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s claim is 
governed by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard[]” until 
the time of the probable cause hearing, when his legal status changes to 
make the plaintiff a pretrial detainee. Id. at 865–67. 
Time Limitations – Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act: 
Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether there is a “gateway” actual 
innocence exception through the statute of limitations for original 
Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act petitions. Id. at 1128. The 
court noted that the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 8th Circuits determined that there is 
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no such “gateway” actual innocence exception, while the 6th Circuit 
found that this exception to the statute of limitations is valid. Id. The 9th 
Circuit agreed with the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 8th Circuits in finding that “the 
omission of ‘actual innocence’ from the enumerated list of exceptions in 
the statutory text is significant . . . .” Id. at 1129. Thus, the 9th Circuit 
concluded that the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act does not 
permit a “gateway” actual innocence exception to the statute of 
limitations. Id. at 1130–31. 
 
SENTENCING 
Enforcement of Plea Agreements – Reductions Based on Amended 
Sentencing Ranges: United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 607 F.3d 283 (1st 
Cir. 2010) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether “a defendant who [is] sentenced 
pursuant to a binding C-type plea agreement . . .” is “entitled to a 
sentence reduction by reason of retroactive amendments to the 
sentencing guidelines designed to lower sentences for crack cocaine 
offenses[.]” Id. at 284. The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Circuits 
have determined that a district court, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), lacks 
authority to modify a sentence imposed pursuant to a C-type plea 
agreement when the agreement was negotiated according to subsequently 
amended sentencing guidelines. Id. at 285–86. The court also noted that 
the 5th and 7th Circuits have approached the issue on a case-by-case 
basis to determine “whether a particular sentence, when rendered, could 
fairly be said to have been based on the guidelines.” Id. at 286. Finally, 
the court noted that the 10th Circuit had held “a district court has 
authority to reduce a sentence imposed pursuant to a C-type plea 
agreement.” Id. The 1st Circuit disagreed with the 2nd and 6th Circuits 
as to district courts’ power to modify sentences imposed pursuant to a  
C-type plea agreement under § 3582. Id. at 288. Instead, the 1st Circuit 
based its holding in contract theory and concluded that “in the absence of 
explicit countervailing language in the plea agreement, 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2) does not apply . . . ”  and defendants who are sentenced 
pursuant to C-type plea agreements are ineligible for sentence reductions. 
Id. at 284. 
Jurisdictional Variation – Fast-Track Reductions: United States v. 
Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2010) 
The 6th Circuit considered “whether to impose a lower sentence 
[for defendant] based on the disparities created by the existence of ‘fast-
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track’ early-disposition programs for illegal-reentry cases in other 
jurisdictions,” following the reasoning in Kimbrough v. United States, 
552 U.S. 85 (2007). Id. at 245. The circuits disagree over the effect of 
“fast-track” reduction for defendants, a congressional policy in border 
jurisdictions allowing for a downward departure from the Sentencing 
Guidelines in exchange for a defendant’s agreement not to file pretrial 
motions or contest issues. Id. at 247–48. Kimbrough allows district 
courts to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines based on disagreement 
with the Guidelines’ policies. Id. at 249. After Kimbrough, the 5th, 9th, 
and 11th Circuits re-affirmed their fast-track precedents, interpreting 
Kimbrough to allow variance only on disagreement with Guidelines’ 
policy, and not with congressional policy. Id. Conversely, the 1st and 3rd 
Circuits read Kimbrough as allowing district courts to depart from the 
Guidelines if the court finds such a departure is “not unwarranted.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The 6th Circuit agreed with the 1st 
and 3rd Circuits, noting that Congress did not prohibit district court 
judges in non-fast-track jurisdictions from treating defendants as if they 
were in a fast-track jurisdiction. Id. The 6th Circuit further rejected the 
argument that Congress endorsed the disparities that would occur among 
defendants in differing jurisdictions, and further, even if such disparity 
was intended, “it has not endorsed the further disparity that is created by 
charge bargaining . . .” among jurisdictions. Id. at 249–50. Thus, the 6th 
Circuit held that “Kimbrough requires that [courts] repudiate any prior 
hint that district judges could not grant variances based on the fast-track 
disparity.” Id. at 250. 
Sentencing Enhancements – Double Counting: United States v. Bell, 
598 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2010) 
The 7th Circuit addressed the issue of “applying a two-level 
enhancement for violating a court order . . . .” Id. at 371. The court noted 
that the 11th and 2nd Circuits determined that two-level enhancements 
are permissible if they punish a defendant for separate, distinct harms. Id. 
The court disagreed with the 11th and 2nd Circuits, noting that the 2nd 
Circuit “may define double counting differently than [the 7th Circuit].” 
Id. at 373. The 7th Circuit refused to embrace the “separate harms theory 
of double counting,” and it focused instead “on the conduct that supports 
the enhancements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
noted that “conduct that always inflicts multiple distinct harms may 
validly receive a punishment enhanced on account of one of the harms.” 
Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit held that applying “both the cross-reference . . . 
and the enhancement for violation of a court or administrative order is 
impermissible double counting.” Id.  
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual – Discretion of the Courts in 
Sentencing: United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2010) 
The 4th Circuit addressed the issue of whether applying the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i) (2008) contravenes 
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, which “prohibits 
retroactive laws that create a ‘significant risk’ of increased punishment 
for a crime.” Id. at 197–99. After a Supreme Court decision deeming the 
Guidelines to be advisory, the circuits “disagreed on whether the Ex Post 
Facto Clause prohibits a sentencing court from retroactively applying 
severity-enhancing Guidelines amendments.” Id. at 199. The D.C. 
Circuit held that retroactively applying the “severity-enhancing” 
Guidelines contravenes the Ex Post Facto Clause, while the 7th Circuit 
decided that the Ex Post Facto Clause allows the retroactive application 
of the “severity-increasing” Guidelines. Id. The 4th Circuit agreed with 
the D.C. Circuit because the D.C. Circuit’s decision better comports with 
the precedent in the 4th Circuit and because it characterizes the 
Guidelines as an “anchor” for a sentencing judge. Id. at 200–02. The 4th 
Circuit disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s reasoning that the “Ex Post Facto 
Clause ‘should apply only to laws and regulations that bind rather than 
advise’ . . .[and that] sentencing judges . . . have ‘unfettered’ discretion 
to sentence outside of the Guidelines range . . . .” Id. at 202. The 4th 
Circuit also disagreed with the 7th Circuit because: (1) “the question is 
not whether the sentencing courts retain discretion under the  
Guidelines . . . [rather,] the proper approach is to assess how the 
sentencing courts exercise their ‘discretion in practice,’ and whether that 
exercise of discretion creates a ‘significant risk’ of prolonged 
punishment,” and (2) in the 7th Circuit, sentencing outside of the 
Guidelines range is subject “only to a ‘light appellate review,’” whereas, 
in the 4th Circuit, “failure to properly calculate the advisory sentencing 
range is a significant procedural error that requires [the court] to vacate 
the ultimate sentence.” Id. at 203. Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded that 
applying the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i) 
contravened the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Id. 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual – Sentence Reduction: United 
States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2010) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether a career offender who receives 
a U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3 downward departure 
under a pre-2003 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines to the Guidelines 
range for crack cocaine offenses is eligible for a sentence reduction 
under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 254. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, and 4th 
Circuits determined that a defendant qualifies for a reduced sentence, 
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while the 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits have held that a defendant does not. 
Id. The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Circuits in finding 
that the defendant’s first sentence must have been based on a range that 
has since been lowered and that the reduction must follow sentencing 
policy statements in order to qualify for further sentence reduction. Id. at 
257. The court disagreed with the 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits findings that 
prior “downward departure has no effect on a defendant’s applicable 
guideline range.” Id. at 266. Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that “a 
career offender who is granted downward departure to the Crack Cocaine 
Guidelines range is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).” 
Id. at 272. 
Supervised Release – Fugitive Status: United States v. Hernandez-
Ferrer, 599 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2010) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether a term of supervised release is 
tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) “during any period in which an 
offender has absconded from supervision[,]” or, more simply, whether an 
offender’s “fugitive status tolls the running of a term of supervised 
release.” Id. at 67. The court noted that the 9th Circuit has agreed with 
the government’s position that “an offender’s fugitive status tolls the 
running of a supervised release.” Id. Though no other court of appeals 
has addressed the same issue, the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and 11th circuits 
have answered an analogous question by “citing the expressio unius 
maxim” and holding that “the pertinent statutes do not authorize tolling a 
term of supervised release during the period in which an offender is 
absent by reason of his deportation.” Id. at 68. The 1st Circuit agreed 
with this reasoning, noting that “when Congress explicitly allows for 
tolling in a particular circumstance, there is a strong presumption that 
Congress did not intend to allow tolling in other circumstances.” Id. 
Therefore, the 1st Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit and held that 
“the fact that Congress provided for tolling a period of supervised release 
only when an offender is imprisoned for a different crime is a decisive 
argument for the proposition that Congress did not intend to toll a period 
of supervised release for any other reason (including an offender’s 
fugitive status).” Id. 
 
